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waived 
continuance.' Continuance of 
rule 10700 
avaiL It sets 




for failun\ to plead ·wilful 
required by the rule.'' 
lJOt 
misconduct \vith 
foregoing reasons I would annul 'the order. 
Petitioner's application for a reheariug· by the Supreme 
was denied June 12, 1936. Gibson, C. ,J., Carter, J., and 
, J., were of the opinion that the application should 
[L.A. No. 23697. In Bank. May 22, 1956.] 
BENE.B'ICIAL J!'IRE AND CASUALTY INSUHANCE 
COlVIPANY (a Corporation), Respondent, v. KUR'l' 
UITKE AND COMPANY, INC. (a Corporation), Ap-
pellant. 
Insurance-Agency for Insurer-Actions-Offer of Proof.-
1n an action by an insurance company against a general 
for declaration of rights under a writtPn contract relat-
to the agent's compensation, where the trial court had 
previously indicated that it would receive no extrinsic evi-
dence of any kind bearing on construction of the contract, 
defendant's offer of proof that the parties construed the con-
tract to mean that sums paid rnonthly to defendant were fully 
that plaintiff never demanded a return of such sums 
they showed in a deficit position, and that under trade 
eustom and usage earned commissions are never returnable, 
was sufficient, though general and somewhat vague. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Insurance, § 33; Appeal and 
§ 184; [4] Evidence, § 414; [5] Evidence, 399; [6] Evi-
§ 410; [7] Contracts, § 161; [8] Usages and Customs, § 6. 
defendant a iitatement 
record all losses and loss expense 
pny defendant all commissions shown 
"earned' the and that 
defendant was to be covered by subsequent 
extrinsic evidence should have been 
the contract was ambiguous as to whether any 
of the commissions paid defendant were returnable to plaintiff. 
141 Evidence-Extrinsic Evidence-In Aid of Interpretation.-
The fact that a questions the meaning of certain words 
clauses in an agreement shows that it is ambiguous so as 
extrinsic evidence the other party to aid in its 
[5] !d.-Extrinsic Evidence-In Aid of Interpretation.-When the 
used in a >vritten contract is fairly susceptible to one 
extrinsic evidence may be considered, 
the terms of the agreement but to aid 
the true intent of the parties; not 
meant something other than was said 
hut to show what meant what they said. 
[6] !d.-Extrinsic Evidence-Surrounding Circumstances.--Where 
auy doubt exists as to the purport of the parties' dealings as 
in the wording of their contract, the court may look 
to the circumstances surrounding its execution-including the 
of 
nature and matter of the agreement-as well 
acts or declarations of the parties shedding 
of their mutual intention at the time 
[7] Contracts-Interpretation-Function of Trial Court.-When a 
rontrnct is in any of its terms or provisions ambiguous or 
it is primarily the duty of the trial rourt to con-
strue it after a full opportunity afforded all the parties to 
evidence of the circumstances and conditions 
its execution and the conduct of the parties rela-
thereto. 
[ ~] SPe Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 279; Am.Jur., EvidPnce, § 1151. 
\ 
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A H'l'B It, ,J.. -Plaintiff, an 1llsm·a m:c eom fH!II,Y, nhl 
fa 1 rm1hle declaration of its nndc'l' a \\Tilt<cll 
raet in its action defemlant agen!. 
contract was made iu 
terms aiH1 as fonnd the 
rlclPJHlant its geueral 
()r in~nrance of a eert<:tin 
ieies to be issued in plaintifl's name as ilNin'r. 
the insurance to be solrl was for r1a 
liability in ecnmceiirm with a r·ci'1iliH dass 
The coutraet was to n:main in J'on·r; mli il :;o 
Hvn 1wtiee of ('illH:ellai imt wm; ::d \'('II ilHT "' r! 1·. 
as amwars, illc coni rnet has not been r·;JJli'l'lled 
aeiioll, for r1eelaraiory relief, was ('OllllllCli<'l'(l 111 
Oeioher, 1 and 11 ilw eunt 1H'i'll 
the pctrli<~s for ai Jc.a,;t two years ! lH•rr•io. 
t•nntraei Jli'<JYi,j(-,j !hat r1r·l',,ndnnl \\<llt1d 1 ~'''<·o!'d': 
ISitH•s,; ll'illl~<l<'i<:ti f<H' 
Oil lllJ>iilll'~,; \\Tit !I'll . ' 
and all pr•'lllllllll,; r·olk<·l,., 
t., ht · 1 1 " i n1 i rr 
eredii for 
11! il'!' and cl<'lll liiOlJ! lily ' :ill 
( I'Hl' ,\]1 JIIOI!i<'l; oi' i•l:llll 
rJ, · 1'1'111 Ill <ll I pol it• li'< I 
II~ IH'O\'ld<·d II Lit<' i'Oiiii':H·i 
u ms exi end<·<! 1 o i J\'itir•·•b 
BENEFICIAL 
defendant was to be at its risk and the 
uv''""o"' were to be defendant to not later 
after the end of the calendar month in which 
was written. (Pars. 4 and 6.) Plaintiff could 
any risk submitted and defendant was not to be en-
titled to any eommissiou 7.) Plaintiff was 
not to be " " for any of defendant's expenses in 
the agency. 9.) Defendant was to provide 
inspection and losses claimed to 
under policies and cooperate with plaintiff in settle-
ment of losses. (Par. 13. Paragraph 14 deals with de-
fendant's compensation as follows : ''On or before the 30th 
day of each month, the Company [plaintiff] will compute 
all premiums earned during the previous month and will 
furnish the General Agent [defendant] with a statement 
thereof, together with a record of all losses and loss expense 
paid and of all reserves for loss incurred on a case basis. 
At such time the Company shall remit to the General Agent 
all commission earned during said previous month. In the 
event the cornp1dation of cornm1·ssion earned at the end of any 
regular monthly adjustment period res1tlts in a deficit against 
the General Agent, this deficit shall be fully covered by a 
subsequent commissio1~ earning before any earned commis-
sion shall be dtte the General Agent." (Emphasis added.) 
Paragraph 15 provides that defendant agreed to accept as 
compensation in full for its services and plaintiff agreed to 
pay compensation to be determined as follows: "From the 
gross earned premium under all policies of insurance ... 
there shall be deducted the following items: (a) losses and 
allocated loss adjustment expense; (b) a fixed charge by the 
Company of a sum equal to 20% of such gross earned pre-
mium; (c) from the residue remaining shall be paid a sum 
as commission to the General Agent not to exceed 30% of the 
gross earned premium." Loss adjustment expense is defined 
as the "allocated" overhead cost of defendant in the adjust-
ment of each claim and is subject to review and in the event 
of dispute it shall be settled by arbitration. The last sen-
tence of that paragraph provided: "As soon after December 
31 of each calendar year as practicable, the underwriting 
profits arising out of the net retained business under this 
contract shall be computed and 50% thereof shall be payable 
to the General Agent. That retainrd business shall be defined 
as the net amount of risk assumed by the Company after 
deducting quota share reinsurance.'' If the parties could not 
any and all amounts due the 
added par. 19.) 
trial court determined that defendant's 
to be determined under paragraph 15 of the contract; 
14 for "interim monthly payments 
on account ''; that under paragraph 19 
determination of the compensation was to be fixed 
had been earned after the term 
written had expired) and all losses had been 
and that defendant's compensation vYas contingent in 
whether defendant received any compensation at all de-
upon a favorable loss experience under the policies 
which could not be determined until all losses had 
and loss adjustment expenses had been paid and 
earned. That as a to cancellation of 
any made to defendant under 
be recovered by plaintiff only out of com-
mJb:SJIUH~ later earned and payable to defendant but that after 
of the contract defendant must repay to plaintiff 
of the sums received under paragraph 14 which 
the amount necessary to pay losses and the other 
mentioned in paragraph ]5. In other words, the trial 
decided that \Yhile the contract was still in effect de-
could the commissions paid to it monthly under 
14 and would not be persomllly liable to return 
but if they were too much, as shown by later 
any overpayment could be deducted from the monthly 
C'o. 1'. KPR'r HrPKE & C.2d 
but at the end of the 
liable for any 
be deducted from commissions found to 
final were treated like 
advances on commissions for which defendant would be ulti-
liable if exceeded the commissions in fact 
in that defendant alone bore the risk 
of whether it would be paid for its services or for 
1 he expense of operating the agency business. 
DefendaJJt contends that none of the commissions to 
it monthly under paragraph 14 are returnable to plaintiff 
and that if the contract is not unequivocally subject to that 
eonstruction, evidence offered by it to explain the contract 
and indicating such construction shcmld have been admitted. 
Plaintiff, of course, contends the trial court's construction 
was correct and there was no ambiguity in the contract. 
[1] Defendant offered to prove: (1) That the parties 
c~ollstrued the contract during the time it was being carried 
out as urged by defendant and to that end plaintiff's vice 
president would testify, as he had by deposition, that the 
sums paid monthly to defendant were fully earned and not 
returnable at any time and that plaintiff had never demanded 
a return of those sums although they showed iu a deficit 
position; (2) that under trade custom and usage in the in-
surance business with respect to general agency contracts, 
in ·which both parties were engaged, earned commissions are 
never returnable. 'l'he trial court rejected the offer. "While 
the offer of proof is general and somewhat vague it is suffi-
dent. 'rhe trial court had previously indicated that it would 
re(~ei ve no extrinsic evidence of any kind bearing upon the 
l:om;truetion of the contract. [2] \Vhcre an entire class of 
eYillenee has been declared inadmissible or the trial court 
has clearly intimated it will receive no evidence of a par-
tiettlar class or upon a particular issue, an offer o:f proof is 
not a prerequisite to raising the question on appeal, and an 
offer, if made, may be broad and general. (H eirnann v. City 
of Los Angeles, 30 Cal.2d 746 [185 P.2d 597]; Lawless v. 
Calaway, 24 Cal.2d 81 [147 P.2d 6041; Cmwinetti v. Pacific 
M1lf. Life Ins. Co., 23 Cal.2d 94 [142 P.2d 741]; Estate of 
Kearns, 36 Cal.2d 531 [225 P.2d 218].) As said in the 
Kearns case: ''At the hearing on the petition :for instructions 
the trial judge stated that the will was not ambiguous and 
that he did not wish to hear any extrinsic evidence. Ac-
eonlingly, 110 witnesses were called, but a statement was made 
BEKEl!'ICIAL INs. Uo. KurrT llrTKE & Uo. 523 
f46 C.2d 517; 297 P.2d 428] 
could 
asserts that some of the evidence which 
could produce is not relevant and that 
under section 105 of the Probate Code. 
discuss in detail the different items 
it is apparent from the record that re-
to the admission of any extrinsic evidence 
was the pnrpose of the court to exclude all such 
the statement made by appellants did 
amount to a formal offer of proof, none was necessary 
tl1e trial com·t har1 declarrd the will was unambiguous 
intimated that no extrimde evidence wonld 
recein1d." (P. 537. 
Extrinsic evidence shonld have been admitted. 'l'he 
was ambiguous. CWith regard to the trade nsave, 
is not necessary; this is later discussed.) The 
(·ontraet could mran that the sums paid defendant monthly 
not retnrnable except possibly out of commissions earned 
the future either before or after cancellation. Paragraph 
supra, provides that plaintiff was to compute the premiums 
during the previous month and give defendant a 
statement thereof together with a record of all losses and 
lose; expense and all reserves. At that time, plaintiff, and 
on the basis of those records, was to pay to de-
fpndant all commission sho>vn to have been "earned" during 
previous month. If from snch regular monthly adjust-
period there is shown a deficit against defendant, it 
to be covered by subsequent or future commissions, that 
from them. Paragraph 15, snpra, could nwan that 
it dealt only with the method of computing defenilant's com-
or compensation and not as indicating that any earnecl 
('ommission:;; paid monthly were to be returne<l. Paragraph 
fL supra, could refct· only to the method of arriving- at rc-
iil drtermining the commission and the snhsequent 
there mentioned could refer onl,,- to a dednRtion 
future commissions of any overpayment of commi:;;sions. 
this is paragraph 19, supra, which provides for 
cancellation bnt reserves, in evrnt of cancellation. the pro-
with regard to eompensation, and, as to those pro-
plaintiff agT('<'S to pay defendant awl defendant to 
all amotm ts tl ue to the other·. Thi:;; eonld mean. as 
indieated tlw trial court. that an aecounting was to be had 
in \Yhieh all of the monthly eommission paymrnts wonlcl be 
rerxamined and that any difference between the partirs off-
not to vary or 
but to aid the court in intent 
... not to show that 'the meant some-
other than what said' but to show 'what they 
meant by what said'. [6] Where any doubt exists 
as to the purport of the in the 
of their to the cir-
surrounding its 
matter of the 
acts or declarations of the 
light upon the question of their mutual intention at the time 
of contracting' .... To this latter point, it is said that 'a 
construction given the contract by the acts and conduct of 
the with knowledge of its before any con-
troversy has arisen as to its meaning, is entitled to great 
weight and when be adopted and enforced 
the court.' (Woodbine v. Van 29 Cal.2d 104 
[173 P.2d 17]. " 33 Cal.2cl 416, 
422 P .2d " 'Once has to be read into 
a contract to make it it can hardly be said to be sus-
ceptible of one It would have been error 
for the trial court to read 
"to find a clear in an 
and done so exclude the extrinsic evidence on the 
ground that as so construed no ambiguity exists.''' (Union 
Oil Co. v. Union Sugat· Co., 31 Cal.2d 300, 306 P.2d 
to trade usage it is clear that both parties 
in the business of issuing and selling insurance 
that connection in arrangements for a general 
Aside from other the phrases "earned com-
, alone, referred to in para-
may have a meaning 
may mean that snch commissions are 
entitled ascertained at the 
events. 'fhis 
Inc ... 19 Cal. 
" ... while words in a contract 
to be construed to their ordi-
or meaning, as the case may be, if in 
the subject matter of the contract, particular 
have by trade usage a different meaning, 
& Co. f 4G C.2d 
sense tradn usage. 
Parol evidence is admissible to establ ifih thn tnH1e usagr>, and 
that is true even though the words are in their or 
entirely unambiguous, inasmuch as reason 
of tlw usage the words are used the in a different 
sensP. (See Code of Civil § 1861 
§§ 1644, 1646, 1655; Lind Co. v. Bower & 
194; Callahan v. Stanley, 57 Cal. 476; Higgins v. 
Petroleum etc. 120 Cal. 629 P. 1080] Cm·o Mattei, 
39 Cal.App. 253 [178 P. 537] ; Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 
IX, § 2463, p. 204; Restatement, Contracts, § § 246, 248; 89 
A.L.R. 1228.)" In Bocly-Steffner Co. v. Plotill Products, Inc., 
63 Cal.App.2d 555 [147 P.2d 84], the court held that evidence 
of custom and usage was admissible to show that a contract 
phrased as one of sale was considered one of ageuc•.y only. 
The court there said: "It is a rule of practically uniwrsal 
acceptation in common law juri:.;dictions that however elear 
and unambiguous the words of a particular contraet may 
appear on its face it is always open 1o the parties to the 
contract to prove that by the general and accepted usage 
of the trade or business in which both parties are engaged 
and to which the contract applies the words have acquired a 
meaning different from their ordinary and popular sense. 
( Civ. Code, § 1644; Code Civ. Proc., § 1861; Hest., Contracts, 
§ 246 (a) ; 2 Williston on Sales, 2d eel., § 618, p. 1556 ; 3 Willis-
ton on Contracts, rev. eel., § 648, pp. 1871-1872, § 650, pp. 
187 4-1879; 9 Wigmore on Evidence, :3d ed., § 2463, p. 204; 
25 C.J.S., Customs and Usages, § 24, pp. 111-112; 17 C.J., 
Id., § 61, pp. 498-499; 12 Am.Jur., Contracts, § 237, pp. 762-
763; note 89 A.L.R. p. 1228, et seq.) 
''The rule is clearly and simply stated in the He:.;tatement 
of the lJaW of Contracts, Reetion 246, Comment on Clause (a) 
in the following language: 'The rule stated in the Clause 
is not confined to unfamiliar words or to words often used 
ambiguously. Familiar words may have different meanings 
in different places. A usage may show that the meaning of a 
written contract is different from an apparently clear mean-
ing which the writing would otherwise bear.' 
''Thus, for example, such an apparently clear expression 
as 'one thousand' may be shown by a trade usage to mean 
more than the number one thousand (Smith v. Wilson, 3 Barn. 
& A dol. 728, llO Eng. He print 266) or less than that number 
Co . 
. W. :j20]), and 
similar nsage, be shown to inclnde 
(1880), L.R 1 Ch. 
thm tlw their contraet may f~videnc0 
the usage. But the mere usc 
\Yhic:h is facie inconsistent with the usage 
hdd to show an intent not to be bound by the 
·where the usage to that very language a 
from that whieh would normally he ascribed to it. .. 
H'S in the canned trade 
as cuter into a contract an~ 
l_v· accepted usage of the trade m that 
the terms and language actually used in 
contract a particular meaning and legal significance, 
that meaning may be at variance with the normal 
and which would be given to that 
in the absence of proof of the usage of the trade." 
It shonld be dear, tlwrdore, that extrinsic evidenc(; was 
here as an aid in construing the contract. 1'he 
by i he parti<>s to the contract since its existencr 
thereunder, the preliminary nrgotia-
1 ion.~ the question of whether custom and usage in the 
insn bnsinrss has given meaning to the terms of the 
ermtrnct are all relevant to the interpretation of it :mel should 
ennble ihc trial court to ascertain the meaning of the con-
traci all that clefendant ofl'ered to 11roYe will be 
( 
.T.. 
and a(lmissible cannot. of eourse, br now determined. 
upon the natun~ ancl r;haraetnr of tlw proof 
made. 
is rnvnrsed. 
Shenk, J., 'rrayuor, ,J., Schauer, ~f., Sywnce, 
,L pro tem., concurred. 
Chairman of Judicial CounciL 
